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INTRODUCTION
The complexity of modern weapon and space systems has required the develop-
ment of imaginative new management-procurement techniques in government
contracting, particularly to apply advanced technology effectively, economically, and
objectively.
One technique, pioneered by the Air Force, is the "associate contractor" approach.
Under this arrangement the weapon or space system is analyzed and divided into
major subsystems which can be contracted for separately. Contracts are then entered
into with "associate" contractors for the several portions of the weapon or space
system. Concurrently, a contract is entered into with an independent third-party
technological contractor to provide the associate contractors, and the government, the
necessary scientific and engineering guidance and coordination.
This work on many Air Force weapons and space systems is being performed by
The Aerospace Corporation, a nonprofit California corporation organized in 196o
by a group of public-spirited individuals to provide competent and objective scientific
and technological services to the government. Aerospace participates in the formula-
tion of requirements and in planning, systems engineering, testing and evaluation.
In performing "systems engineering," Aerospace works with the associate contractors
and advises the Air Force as to progress, problems, and reorientation necessary to
achieve a compatible whole.
The third-party technological contractor is "in the middle" between many rights
and responsibilities. Its duties, and its contractual position, are analogous in many
respects to those of an architect-engineer performing services in connection with
construction. In addition, however, it must necessarily establish and maintain even
closer working relationships with, and secure current and sometimes private in-
formation from, both the government and the associate contractors.
Success of the technological contractor in this arrangement depends primarily
upon its achievement and maintenance of technical competence. Success is also
dependent upon its acceptance by industry. Such acceptance depends in part upon
careful analyses of the legal aspects of these relationships and development of solu-
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tions for the inherent problems, such as privity of contract questions, responsibilities
of the contractor, access to and protection of private data, and conflicts of interest.
I
A BRIEF HIsToRY
With the advent of the more complex ballistic missile, concern arose that con-
tractors in the aerospace industry did not have and might not be able to assemble a
sufficient across-the-board technical competence to perform expeditiously and
effectively the scientific and technological work required. This work was referred
to as "systems engineering."'
The Air Force, in some of its programs, divided the weapon or space system
into major subsystems, each amenable to being contracted for separately. It awarded
a contract for each. The several contractors were called "associate" contractors. The
Air Force also entered into a separate contract with a third-party technological
contractor to provide systems engineering in the integration of the subsystems,
accomplishment of the necessary design compromises among them, and definition
of interfaces
Although successful, the introduction of the third-party systems engineer caused
concern that it might gain a competitive advantage over the associate contractors
from its intimate knowledge and relationship with them and with the government.
Ultimately, the Air Force added to its inventory of management techniques that of
contracting with the nonprofit Aerospace Corporation as third-party technological
contractor, in order to assure maximum corporate objectivity and freedom of in-
formation exchange.3
II
WHY A NONPROFIT CORPORATION?
Nonprofit corporations are not new. The laws of many states provide for their
creation The federal and most state laws recognize their dedicated purposes and,
accordingly, prescribe income tax exemption for them
Nor are nonprofit corporations new in the field of furnishing scientific advice
and assistance to the federal government. It has been noted that President Andrew
Jackson made use of a nonprofit corporation for scientific support in the early i8oos,
and that a nonprofit organization was used in weapon system development-to
develop a self-propelled, man-carrying "aerodrome"--as early as i898P
'House Committee on Government Operations, Eleventh Report, H.R. RES. No. 1121, 86th Cong.,
zst Sess. (1959).
-House Committee on Government Operations, Third Report, H.R. REP. No. 324, 87th Cong., Ist
Sess. 3 i. (i96i).
'Id. at 4, 9, esp. 15 f.
" HowARD L. OLECK, NoN-PROFIT CORPORATIONS AND AssocIATIoNs, ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND
DissoLUTIOrN 6, 8 ff. (1956).
'Id. at 336 f., INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501.
o The Non-Profit Corporation, Gimmick or Godsend in Weapon System Development, remarks by
268 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The use of a nonprofit corporation such as the Aerospace Corporation as a third-
party systems architect-engineer has certain advantages in the public interest. The
corporation's purposes must be in the public interest or it will not come into being
as a nonprofit corporation and its practices must remain so or it will not endure.
Moneys it receives are correspondingly dedicated to the public interest and not
siphoned off into other channels. No portion of its earnings may be distributed as
dividends or for the benefit of any individual; it may not unreasonably accumulate
assets and it may not pay unreasonable salaries.1 It cannot engage in commercial
activities without risking loss of its tax exemption.8 Consequently, it poses no threat
to industry.
III
THE FUNCTION OF AEROSPACE AS THIRD-PARTY SYsTEMs ARCHITE -ENGINEER
If each associate contractor were working independently it could proceed un-
encumbered by need for knowledge of, or communication with, the others. Knowl-
edge gained as the contractors proceed, however, calls for modifications of the
original specifications; each modification usually affects the other subsystems.
Overall integration of the system, design compromises among subsystems, definition
of interfaces, analysis of subsystems, and supervision of system testing must be accom-
plished. Competent, objective technological analysis and rapid exchange of informa-
tion are vital. These are the primary purposes of the Air Force's contracts with
Aerospace Corporation. Because of the progress industry has made in increased
technical competence during the last ten years, it is generally unnecessary for Aero-
space to become enmeshed in the detailed work of the associate contractorsy
Consequently, the Air Force usually contracts with Aerospace for "General Systems
Engineering and Technical Direction." Briefly it may be described as follows:
General Systems Engineering. That portion of system engineering dealing with the
overall integration of a system, design compromise among subsystems, definition of
interfaces, analysis of subsystems, and supervision of system testing; all to the extent
required to assure that system concept and objectives are being met in an economical and
timely manner.
Technical Direction. That process by which a contractor's work is reviewed; information
on progress and problems is exchanged; plans for future work are discussed; and, where
it will better achieve Air Force objectives, the contractor's technical effort is modified,
realigned, or redirected....lo
To fulfill this function, the entity performing it needs the following:
(i) the highest degree of technical competence;
Max Golden, then General Counsel, Dep't of the Air Force, before the Government Contracts and
Procurement Law Committee of the Federal Bar Association Annual Convention, Sept. 14, 196r.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501-504.
'Id. §§502, 504, 511-514.
"House Committee on Government Operations, Third Report, supra note 2, at 13 ff., esp. 22, 23.
" Headquarters Space Systems Division (SSD) (Air Force Systems Command), SSD Regulation 8o-9,
Sept. 23, x963.
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(2) access to all the pertinent facts;
(3) ability to effectuate, or have effectuated, its judgments;
(4) the highest degree of integrity;
(5) confidence of the associate contractors and of the government.
IV
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR SUCCESS
In view of these needs, Aerospace has found it necessary to seek solutions for a
number of legal problems:
i. How does it accomplish the general systems engineering function, which
affects the contractual position of others, without privity of contract with
them?
2. What are its responsibilities?
3. How does it secure access to information which others might consider
"private" information without incurring prohibitive potential liability, and
how are others' rights in data protected?
4. How are the government and associate contractors protected against con-
flicts of Aerospace employees' private interests?
A. Privity of Contract
The problem which will probably first occur to the lawyer is that there is no
privity of contract between Aerospace and the associate contractors.11 The associate
contractor ordinarily can only be responsive to the party with whom it has a con-
tract-the government. Unless this contractual gap is filled, systems engineering and
technical direction cannot be effectively performed.
This void in privity of contract between the associate contractors and Aerospace
has been bridged by use of what are referred to as "enabling clauses."'" The purpose
of the enabling clauses is to require the associate contractors to recognize Aerospace's
function and to cooperate in its fulfillment. They serve, also, to give the associate
contractor contractual protection. One of them provides as follows:
. . . In the performance of this contract, the Contractor agrees to cooperate with the
Aerospace Corporation by responding to invitations to meetings, requests for technical
information, and requests for research and development planning data on all matters
pertaining to this contract and by discussing with the Aeropsace Corporation employees
technical matters relating to this program. The Contractor further agrees to accept
technical direction as described herein.18
" For a government contract analogy to the contractual relationship between the government and prime
contractor's subcontractor, see Merritt v. United States, 267 U.S. 338 (1925); Sullivan v. United States, .29
Ct. Cl. 65 (1954); Livingston v. United States, ioi Ct. Cl. 625 (1944); Borg Warner Corp. v. United
States, 340 U.S. 946 (i95i).
"5 "Enabling Clause. A group of words placed in an associate contractor's contract by mutual agreement
between the Air Force and the associate contractor which permits Aerospace Corporation to perform its
appointed duties for the Air Force. SSD Regulation 80-9, supra note io.
1l Ibid.
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More legal and contractual hurdles are encountered when inputs from Aerospace
affect the associate contractor's contractual obligations-such as requiring a change
in specifications, affecting its cost of performance.
Much, if not most, of the advice, recommendations and technical direction by
Aerospace does not have a visible effect on the associate contractors' contractual
specifications or costs. On occasion the effect is significant. The associate contractor
is vitally interested both in the successful performance of its work and in making
a reasonable profit. The success of its performance, in the contractual sense, depends
upon compliance with the agreed upon specifications, terms, and conditions. It
cannot deviate from the specifications nor incur extra costs without the concurrence
of its customer. To do so would be to risk disallowance of the cost incurred and,
consequently, reduction of profit.
Also, it is the government's position, based on statute and implemented in regula-
tions and contracts, that only a duly authorized representative or agent of the
government may obligate the government. 4 It is said that he alone may authorize
a contract "change" or authorize a contractor to incur additional costs to be re-
imbursed by the government. Individual contracting officers, too, are reluctant to
place authority in the hands of others on the basis it might later be found to have
been an improper delegation of duties and responsibilities.
To resolve these issues, another portion of one of the "technical direction" defini-
tions provides as follows: "Technical Directives. Where contractual change is in-
volved or where the Air Force, the Aerospace Corporation, or the contractor may so
request, specific technical direction will be formalized as serially-numbered Air
Force/Aerospace 'Technical Directives' (TDs)."'"
B. Responsibilities
The function of the third-party systems architect-engineer, as noted above, is most
closely analogous to the work customarily performed by an architect-engineer in
connection with construction work. In the absence of any statutory or case law on
the point, this analogy would seem appropriate in analyzing another legal aspect of
the systems architect-engineer's position: responsibility.
The duties and liabilities of an architect may be described as follows:
The duty owed by an architect to his employer is that he will exercise and apply his skill
and ability, judgment and taste, reasonably and without neglect. . . . Both the owner
and the contractor are entitled to rely upon the architect's judgment, and he must exercise
all his professional skill and knowledge as an expert in advising them....
"
4Pierce v. United States, Dover Five Cent Bank v. United States (The Floyd Acceptance Cases), 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 666 (1868); Jay Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875); Salomon v. United States,
7 Ct. Cl. 482 (1871); Armed Services Procurement Regulation 1-201.3 and 1-402, 32 C.F.R. §5 1.201-3
and 1.402 (Supp. 1963); and see for example, Air Force Procurement Instruction § x, Pt. 4, 32 C.F.I.
§ I.ooi (Supp. 1963).1 SSD Regulation 8o-9, supra note io.
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The architect will be held responsible for all the duties he is required to perform under
the contract, and an architect's duty to direct and inspect construction work carries with
it the duty to condemn work which he considers unfit... .16
An architect is bound to perform to professional standards. He is bound to
exercise reasonable care, apply an intelligence befitting his profession, and perform
proper investigation and have sufficient knowledge of the subject matter, in all its
details. He must use reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the application
of his knowledge to accomplish the purpose for which he is employed. The pos-
session of these characteristics and abilities is implied in his contract.1 7  They are
similarly implied in Aerospace's contract with the government for general systems
engineering and technical direction.
Were Aerospace given authority to make final decisions or act as an arbitrator,
its position could be likened to that of an agent of the owner, and its duties and
liabilities would increase. It would bear the liability of an agent and would prob-
ably bear liability in the order of magnitude applicable under common law rules of
negligence liability.' s The government, however, does not delegate to Aerospace
the powers of an agent or final arbiter, and in the final analysis its powers are those
of a corporate professional technical advisor to the government.
The high standards of performance legally imposed upon Aerospace as a systems
architect-engineer under the principles noted-when added to the inherent motiva-
tion to perform well which stems from its origins and its professional stature-assure
the public of a professional attitude that is deeply responsible.
C. Private Information: Access and Protection
A thoughtful look at the close relationships which contribute to successful per-
formance by the third-party systems architect-engineer brings the realization that it
must have access to a wide range of the associate contractors' data and other informa-
tion. It is not enough to base a scientific or technological judgment on incomplete
facts. And when "all" of the facts are required, some private associate contractor
data must be included.
Outside the protection afforded by the patent system lies a vast store of informa-
tion and data which can be protected only if kept secret. It may consist of a formula,
pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it. In the absence of breach of contract, abuse of confidence, or im-
propriety in the means of procurement, such secrets may be copied as freely as devices
or processes which are not secret. 9 Protection is afforded only by a general duty
6 C.J.S. Architects § 17 (1937).
' 6 C.J.S. Architects § 17 (1937); 3 Amd. Ju-R. Architects § x9 (1936); 5 Amva. J R. 2d Architects § 23
(1962); Witherspoon, When Is An Architect Liable?, 48 A.B.A.J. 321 (1962).
'
8 Witherspoon, supra note X7.
'
0 REsrA iEENT, TORTS § 757 and comment (1939); Note, Protection and Use of Trade Secrets, 64
HA.v. L. Rlv. 976-86 (ig5i); see also, Annot., 17o A.,.R. 449 (947).
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of good faith. Liability rests upon breach of this duty; that is, breach of contract,
abuse of confidence, or impropriety in the method of ascertaining the secret.
Government contractors in the aerospace industry historically have attempted to
protect unpatented information by "trade secret" techniques. They limit its distri-
bution and endeavor to establish confidential relationships and impose restrictive
legends when necessity requires that it be communicated to others. They withhold
it from their competitors; they may withhold it from the government for fear it
might be used as the basis for soliciting bids from their competitors. Validity of these
fears might be debated but their existence is unquestioned. 20 The liability of the
government for misuse of such private information and the ability of the contractor
to secure a satisfactory recovery also have been questioned.2'
Then, how is Aerospace to have access to this information when it is part of
the pertinent data? To receive it entails running the risk of suit for breach of the
confidential relationship and facing loss of reputation for integrity. Potential conflicts
of interests are encountered since it might be necessary to communicate the in-
formation to the government. On the other hand, a policy of refusing the data
creates ignorance in an area where knowledge is of major importance to the nation's
interests.
One solution to this dilemma has been well received. It is to accept all essential
information, giving special handling to that which the other party considers to be
proprietary information or a trade secret. The associate contractors are assured
that the information will be given the care and protection a prudent technological
contractor would give its own proprietary information, with the caveat that it must
be given to the government if required. This assurance is coupled with appropriate
internal control practices and procedures. If the associate contractor is not satisfied
by a review of the recipient's attitudes and reputation and its policies and procedures
applicable to others' proprietary data, the problem can be resolved by negotiation
of a special contract outlining the parties' rights and duties with respect to specifically'
identified data.
D. Protection Against Employees' Conflicts of Interests
What is conflict of interest? During the past year the President, the Attorney
General, and the Congress of the United States have participated in renewed
attempts to define and regulate conflicts of interests of employees and consultants
to the government. 2 This is but the latest in a long history of such endeavors.
"Beach, A Question of Property Rights: The Government and Industrial Know How, 41 A.B.A.J.
1024-27, 1085-87 (1955).21 Harris, Trade Secrets as They Affect the Government, 18 Bus. LAw. 613-26, esp. 614, 6x5, 617
(1963); Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw. U. L. Rav. 437 (ig6o).2 2 Pub. L. No. 87-849, 76 Stat. iix (1962), i8 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq. (Supp. x963). Department of
Justice Memorandum Regarding Conflict of Interest Provisions of Public Law No. 87-849, Jan. 28, 1963, 28
Fed. Reg. 985 (1963); The President's Memorandum on Preventing Conflicts of Interests on the Part of
Special Government Employees, May 2, 1963, 28 Fed. Reg. 4539 (5963).
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It is generally accepted, however, that the clarity and utility of the conflict of interest
laws applicable to government employees have been less than satisfactory
3
Nevertheless, not even such legislative sanctions as these are available to the
private employer. It has available the civil law remedies arising out of the master-
servant relationship. But these are more remedial than preventive.
If it is to perform well its third-party systems architect-engineer function, Aero-
space Corporation must maintain an especially high degree of integrity and respect.
It is constantly subject to suspicion that its associations with, and the interests of its
employees and officers or trustees in, other companies might lead to more favorable
treatment or prejudice in favor of one company over another. It must be in a
position to assure the associate contractors and the government that it has taken
satisfactory measures to minimize the possibility of its employees acting for it in
matters involving or affecting their private economic interests. It needs not only
to find and remove the few who might consciously do so, but also to give direction
to the well-intentioned who might otherwise do so.
Policies imposing high standards of conduct must be adopted and promulgated
widely if these goals are to be achieved. A procedure requiring periodic disclosures
to top management of the outside interests of all employees in sensitive positions can
provide a way of discovering potential conflicts and eliminating them in advance.
Enforcement of these requirements-both during the employment relationship and
after it is terminated--can be facilitated by making them a part of the individual's
express or implied contract of employment. And, of course, the effectiveness of
these procedures over the long run will depend upon the strictness and fairness with
which they are enforced.
These, in essence, are the policies Aerospace has adopted. They appear to have
served the need and been well received by both industry and the government.24
V
PROGNOSIS
Finality in the development of management-procurement techniques is not to be
expected in such a dynamic field. Studies of when to contract with nonprofit
corporations and when to contract with industry have been and continue to be
made.25 The relationships of the Air Force and nonprofit corporations have been
given considerable scrutiny 6 Conflict of interest aspects of defense contracting
"' See ASS'N oF THE BA. OF THE CITY OF Nzw YOlK, SPscrAL CoMMIrZ E ON FEDERAL CONFLICr oF
INTEREST LAws, CoNFLICT OF INTEREST AND FaERAL SERvicE (196o).
"' See House Comm. on Government Operations, Thirteenth Report, H.R. REP. No. 9x7, 88th Cong.,
xst Sess. 86, 87 (x963).
' U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research and
Development (the Bell Report), S. Doc. No. 94, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (x962); Department of Defense
Directive No. 5500.o, Rules for Avoidance of Organizational Conflicts of Interest, June 1, 1963; Armed
Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) 1-113.2, 32 C.F.R. § 1.113-2 (Rev. 3, Nov. 15, 1963).
" Policies on Relations with Air Force Sponsored Nonprofit Corporations, issued by Eugene Zuckert,
Secretary of the Air Force, Sept. 22, i96i.
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and employment as a whole, as well as in the use of nonprofit corporations, are
currently under consideration.
2 7
The use of the associate contractor management-procurement technique is one
of many tools available to the government today. The use of a nonprofit corporation
as a third-party systems architect-engineer in this arrangement is a refinement which
appears to resolve many of the problems which have been recognized in the course
of its evolution. Its implementation has necessitated resolution of other, incidental
problems.
As modern technology continues to advance, more problems will arise and
their solutions must be derived. But the use of a nonprofit corporation as third-
party systems architect-engineer in the associate contractor management-procurement
technique is today a successful, working arrangement.
2 House Comm. on Government Operations, Thirteenth Report, H.R. Rer. No. 917, 88th Cong., ist
Ses. (1963).
